Ex Parte Seizures and the Defend Trade Secrets Act by Goldman, Eric
Washington and Lee Law Review Online 
Volume 72 Issue 2 Article 4 
11-30-2015 
Ex Parte Seizures and the Defend Trade Secrets Act 
Eric Goldman 
Santa Clara University School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr-online 
 Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Eric Goldman, Ex Parte Seizures and the Defend Trade Secrets Act, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 284 
(2015), https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr-online/vol72/iss2/4 
This Roundtable: The Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2015 is brought to you for free and open access by the Law 
School Journals at Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Washington and Lee Law Review Online by an authorized editor of Washington & Lee University School 
of Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact christensena@wlu.edu. 
 
284 
Ex Parte Seizures and the Defend 
Trade Secrets Act 
By Eric Goldman* 
Abstract 
Congress is considering the Defend Trade Secrets Act, which 
would create a new federal trade secret civil cause of action. The 
Act includes a quirky and unprecedented ex parte procedure for 
trade secret owners to obtain a seizure order. The seizure provision 
applies in, at best, a narrow set of circumstances, and it oddly 
attempts to protect intangible trade secrets by seizing chattels. 
Despite procedural safeguards, the seizure provision also enables 
anti-competitive misuse.  
More generally, the fact-based disputes that inevitably must 
be resolved in trade secret litigation make trade secrets an 
especially poor basis for ex parte actions. As a result, we should be 
nervous about the proposed seizure provision in the Defend Trade 
Secret Act—and all other ex parte seizure procedures in trade 
secret cases. 
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I. Introduction 
Perhaps the most unusual feature of the Defend Trade Secret 
Act of 2015 (hereinafter the “Act”)1 is its lengthy provisions 
enabling trade secret owners to obtain seizure orders on an ex 
parte basis (hereinafter the “Seizure Provision”). Visually, the 
Seizure Provision dominates the Act’s text, accounting for about 
42% of its word count.2 Doctrinally, the Seizure Provision would 
represent an unprecedented innovation. No state trade secret law 
has a trade secret-specific ex parte seizure process similar to the 
Seizure Provision.3 
                                                                                                     
 1. Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2015, H.R. 3326 & S. 1890, 114th Cong. 
(2015). All quotations of and citations in this Essay to the Seizure Provision’s 
terms are to the Senate’s version as of July 29, 2015 [hereinafter DTSA]. The 
Seizure Provisions appear to be identical in both the House and Senate bills as 
introduced. 
 2. The House bill (H.R. 3326) has 2,810 words, of which the Seizure 
Provision accounts for 1,180 words. H.R. 3326, 114th Cong. (2015).  
 3. See Markup of: H.R. 5233, “The Trade Secrets Protection Act of 2014” 
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The Seizure Provision attracted strong criticism in the bill’s 
2014 draft,4 and it easily could have been removed from the bill to 
help move the bill forward. Instead, the Seizure Provision 
reappeared, albeit in weakened form,5 in the bill’s 2015 version. 
Given how the Provision survived in the face of criticism and 
occupies such a large share of the bill’s text, the Seizure Provision 
seems extraordinarily important to the bill’s sponsors and 
advocates.6 
Yet, the Seizure Provision does not solve many, if any, 
problems. In light of the remedies already available to trade 
secret owners in ex parte temporary restraining orders (TROs), 
the Seizure Provision purports to apply to only a narrow set of 
additional circumstances. In exchange for that modest benefit, 
                                                                                                     
Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. ll. 415–29 (2014) (statement 
of Rep. Lofgren), http://judiciary.house.gov/_cache/files/4d029f1e-fbf3-40e1-acdd-
e555b464c984/09.17.14-markup-transcript.pdf (last visited Oct. 25, 2015) 
[hereinafter Markup Hearing] (“[I]t is worth noting that the UTSA has been 
enacted by 47 states and the District of Columbia, and not a single one of those 
entities, not the 47 states or D.C., have included an ex parte seizure provision.”) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  The proposed European 
Union (EU) Trade Secret Directive requires seizure procedures but does not 
require any ex parte mechanism. See Proposal for a Directive of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on the Protection of Undisclosed Know-How and 
Business Information (Trade Secrets) Against Their Unlawful Acquisition, Use 
and Disclosure, § 2, art. 9(1), COM (2013) 813 final (Nov. 28, 2013) (stating that 
Members “shall ensure that the competent judicial authorities may, at the 
request of the trade secret holder,” order a variety of “interim and precautionary 
measures against the alleged infringer”), 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52013PC081
3&from=EN. 
 4. See, e.g., Markup Hearing, supra note 3, ll. 257–63, 696–700 
(statements of Reps. Lofgren and Johnson) (noting their express objections to 
the seizure provisions). See generally Goldman, supra note * (explaining 
negative reactions to the ex parte seizure provisions).  
 5. See David S. Levine & Sharon K. Sandeen, An Open Letter to the 
Sponsors of the Revised Defend Trade Secrets Act, TECH. & MARKETING L. BLOG 
(Aug. 3, 2015), http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2015/08/federal-trade-secret-
bill-re-introduced-and-its-still-troublesome-guest-blog-post.htm (last visited Oct. 
25, 2015) (cataloging some of the differences between the Seizure Provision in 
the 2014 and 2015 bill versions) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review).  
 6. See, e.g., Markup Hearing, supra note 3, ll. 570–71 (statement of Rep. 
Nadler) (calling it a “key component” of the bill); id. l. 680 (statement of Rep. 
Holding) (calling it a “key section”); id. l. 696 (statement of Rep. Johnson) 
(observing that the Seizure Provision seems to be “the biggest addition” of the 
bill). 
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the Seizure Provision creates the risk of anti-competitive seizures 
and seizures that cause substantial collateral damage to innocent 
third parties. To discourage such abuses, the Act imposes 
procedural safeguards and creates a cause of action for wrongful 
seizures. Unfortunately, those safeguards are miscalibrated to 
achieve the desired protections against abusive seizures.  
Tightening the Act’s safeguards would not fix the more 
fundamental problems with ex parte seizures in trade secret 
cases. Trade secret cases routinely involve factual disputes that 
will not be appropriate for ex parte resolution and will increase 
the potential for erroneous seizures, even when trade secret 
owners are careful and well-meaning. The types of fact inquiries 
required for trade secret cases differ in important ways from the 
inquiries required in copyright and trademark cases; so although 
copyrights and trademarks have dedicated ex parte seizure 
provisions, the idiosyncratic attributes of trade secret cases make 
ex parte proceedings even more problematic.  
Because of the unique problems raised by ex parte 
determinations of trade secret issues, any trade secret-based ex 
parte seizure has an unusually high risk of error. Therefore, 
Congress and judges should approach any ex parte remedies in 
trade secret cases with extreme caution. 
II. The Seizure Provision 
A. What It Says 
In general, the Act provides a way for a trade secret owner to 
obtain, on an ex parte basis, an order to seize “property necessary 
to prevent the propagation or dissemination of the trade secret 
that is the subject of the action.”7 The Seizure Provision applies 
when a party “would destroy, move, hide, or otherwise make [the 
material to be seized] inaccessible to the court” if he or she 
received notice of the proceeding.8  
The plaintiff can request the seizure in the complaint or in 
an affidavit,9 and the statute specifies factors the judge should 
                                                                                                     
 7. S. 1890, 114th Cong. § 2(b)(2)(A)(i) (2015). 
 8. Id. § 2(b)(2)(A)(ii)(VI). 
 9. Id. § 2(b)(2)(A)(i). 
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consider.10 If the court grants the seizure order, it must set a 
hearing within seven days.11 The plaintiff must post a bond,12 
may not publicize the seizure,13 and must deposit the seized 
materials with the court.14 Furthermore, the plaintiff must show 
“immediate and irreparable injury”15 and that the harm it will 
suffer outweighs the harm to other parties.16  
At the hearing, if the plaintiff cannot make the necessary 
showing of its case, the seizure order must be dissolved or 
modified appropriately.17 Any party injured by the seizure may 
sue for “a wrongful or excessive seizure.”18 
B. Two Key Drafting Ambiguities 
Despite its length, the Seizure Provision is not well drafted. 
Two key ambiguities stand out. 
1. What Assets Can Be Seized? 
The statute indicates that the plaintiff can seize “property 
necessary to prevent the propagation or dissemination of the 
trade secret that is the subject of the action.”19 This makes sense 
in a situation where a single, high-value chattel item (a “Valuable 
Artifact”) contains the trade secret. For example, if someone 
steals the papers containing the Coca-Cola secret recipe,20 the 
                                                                                                     
 10. Id. § 2(b)(2)(A)(ii). 
 11. Id. § 2(b)(2)(B)(iv). 
 12. Id. § 2(b)(2)(B)(v). 
 13. Id. § 2(b)(2)(C). 
 14. Id. § 2(b)(2)(D). 
 15. Id. § 2(b)(2)(A)(ii)(II). 
 16. Id. § 2(b)(2)(A)(ii)(III). 
 17. Id. § 2(b)(2)(F)(ii). 
 18. Id. § 2(b)(2)(G). 
 19. Id. § 2(b)(2)(A)(i). 
 20. Coca-Cola’s formula is the paradigmatic example of a venerable 
high-value trade secret, although it is not clear if it has, in fact, remained a 
secret. See This American Life Reveals What it Believes Is the Original Recipe for 
Coca-Cola, PR NEWSWIRE (Feb. 15, 2011), http://www.prnewswire.com/news-
releases/this-american-life-reveals-what-it-believes-is-the-original-recipe-for-
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Seizure Provision could help the trade secret owner seize those 
papers before they got too far. Representative Goodlatte provided 
a paradigmatic situation where the Seizure Provision is supposed 
to help: “[A] thief sneaks into a facility, steals a trade secret and 
is heading to the airport to fly to China and sell it.”21 
Representative Goodlatte’s “grab-and-go” scenario sounds 
like the premise of a Hollywood blockbuster movie,22 but outside 
of the movies, how often do such situations occur? Even the bill 
supporters recognize the Seizure Provision should apply only in 
“the most extreme cases.”23 Even then, if someone is truly 
“heading to the airport,” the trade secret owner needs a faster 
mechanism than any court can provide.24 If a fleeing criminal has 
                                                                                                     
coca-cola-116263029.html (last visited Oct. 25, 2015) (stating that the public 
radio program “found what appeared to be a copy of the famously guarded trade 
secret in a newspaper column published in the Atlanta Journal and Constitution 
on February 18, 1979”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Cf. 
infra Part II.B.1 (discussing whether a court can properly determine trade 
secret status in an ex parte proceeding). 
 21. Markup Hearing, supra note 3, ll. 511–14 (statement of Rep. 
Goodlatte); see also id. ll. 572–73 (statement of Rep. Nadler) (the Seizure 
Provision “will stop thieves planning to flee the country with stolen American 
property”). 
 22. This description generally fits the “heist” and “caper” genres of 
Hollywood films, which often involve cash or a valuable artifact as the targeted 
item but sometimes include high-value information as the target. Thus, a 
“grab-and-go” plot motif is quite common in movies. Some blockbuster 
heist/caper movies where a “trade secret” type item is the target include 
Blackhat, The Dark Knight, Jurassic Park, Mission Impossible (both I and III), 
Paycheck, Salt, and Sneakers. If Congress’s grab-and-go concerns are really 
being fueled by Hollywood’s imagination, it would not be the first time; 
Congress’s enactment of the Computer Fraud & Abuse Act in response to the 
movie WarGames (1983) is a classic example. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012). 
 23. Markup Hearing, supra note 3, ll. 526–27 (statement of Rep. 
Goodlatte); see also id. ll. 594–95 (statement of Rep. Nadler) (asserting that it 
will be “extremely difficult to obtain a seizure order under this bill as it should 
be”).  
 24. See R. Mark Halligan, Protection of U.S. Trade Secret Assets: Critical 
Amendments to the Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 7 J. MARSH. REV. INTELL. 
PROP. L. 656, 682 (2008) (arguing in favor of a seizure provision because in 
today’s environment, trade secrets can be transferred to foreign countries and 
other parts of the world in seconds). Halligan further argues that the traditional 
process of notice to the defendant and opportunity to be heard do not work well 
in trade secret cases because the defendants can hide or destroy the purloined 
trade secret assets in seconds. Id.  
  If the real problem occurs instantaneously (“in seconds”!), no court 
procedure will solve that problem, even if we completely give up any pretense of 
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stolen a Valuable Artifact, the trade secret owner will need to call 
law enforcement, not run to a court.  
Although the Seizure Provision’s application to the Valuable 
Artifact scenario ought to substantially limit its effects, 
unfortunately the Seizure Provision was not drafted so narrowly. 
By its terms, it applies to other, more common types of trade 
secret misappropriation.  
For example, assume the trade secret owner is chasing 
software source code instead of a Valuable Artifact. The Seizure 
Provision seemingly allows the trade secret owner to seize any 
storage medium containing the uncompiled source code. If that is 
a computer server, then a seizure could cause significant 
collateral damage, as servers often will contain other information 
that was not misappropriated and may be crucial to the 
defendant’s business operations.25 And how would the provision 
apply if the defendant is selling executable software compiled 
from the source code? It is unclear if the Seizure Provision would 
extend to all executable code versions of the software; if it does, 
then the Seizure Provision would allow the trade secret owner to 
take its rival out of the market, at least for a short while. 
The seizable assets are also unclear in a typical “departing 
employee” situation. Sometimes, the departing employee will 
email, or download to a flash drive, a substantial number of 
stolen electronic files. Obviously, the flash drive can be seized, 
but the Seizure Provision apparently allows seizure of every other 
copy of allegedly stolen information, which could include every 
computer that contains one or more stolen files, along with any 
hard copy files containing printouts. Read literally, every storage 
medium of a departing employee’s new employer potentially 
would be subject to seizure. A thorough seizure in a departing 
employee situation could easily shut down the new employer 
until the hearing. 
                                                                                                     
due process.  
 25. Cf. Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. U.S. Secret Serv., 816 F. Supp. 432, 
438 (W.D. Tex. 1993) (describing the loss sustained by the business due to the 
government’s seizure), aff’d on other grounds, 36 F.3d 457 (5th Cir. 1994). In 
that famous case, the Secret Service seized a computer server containing an 
allegedly stolen file, but taking the server in its entirety caused significant 
collateral damage that permanently undermined the company’s business. 
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To reduce the risk of overreaching seizures, the Act provides 
that any seizure order must 
provide for the narrowest seizure of property necessary to 
achieve the purpose of this paragraph and direct that the 
seizure be conducted in a manner that minimizes any 
interruption of the business operations of third parties and, to 
the extent possible, does not interrupt the legitimate business 
operations of the person accused of misappropriating the trade 
secret that are unrelated to the trade secret that has allegedly 
been misappropriated.26 
That sounds terrific, but how will this work in practice? If a 
computer hard drive has a single file containing a 
misappropriated trade secret commingled among a hundred 
thousand other files, how will someone implement a “narrow” 
seizure? If the seizure does not grab the hard drive in total, 
someone must review all of the files to find the ones with illicit 
content and then delete those files27 or technologically render the 
files inaccessible. Either the task will consume extraordinary 
amounts of labor, time and skill, or the “narrowest” seizure will 
not be very narrow. And due to the easy dissemination of 
electronic data, a seizure may require the review of dozens or 
hundreds of chattel items.  
The emphasis on Valuable Artifacts reflects outmoded 
twentieth century thinking; it attempts to control chattels to 
protect intangible assets. This mismatch between tangible and 
intangible means the Seizure Provision fundamentally 
misapprehends the modern nature of trade secrets. 
2. What Financial Exposure Will a Mistaken Plaintiff Face? 
The Act creates a new cause of action for parties injured by a 
“wrongful or excessive seizure,” but the statute does not specify 
the applicable scienter requirement.28 Perhaps this means that 
                                                                                                     
 26. S. 1890, 114th Cong. § 2(b)(2)(B)(ii) (2015). 
 27. And would the deleted file be backed up somewhere for restoration if 
the seizure is erroneous, or will the deletion be permanent? 
 28. In the analogous Lanham Act provision for seizing counterfeit goods, 
the “term ‘wrongful seizure’ was intentionally left undefined by Congress.” 5 
MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 30:44 (4th ed. 2015). See 
generally Michael Coblenz, How the Seizure of Counterfeit Goods Can Go Bad: 
292 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 284 (2015) 
the standard is strict liability. If so, trade secret owners will not 
use the Seizure Provision because they will face liability for 
making any mistake, however innocent—and, as discussed below, 
even a well-prepared and well-meaning trade secret owner may 
make unavoidable mistakes. Thus, strict liability would almost 
certainly negate the Seizure Provision in practice. 
More likely, courts interpreting the word “wrongful” will read 
a scienter requirement into the statute. This would have two 
unwanted consequences. First, it would set up costly battles over 
the trade secret owner’s scienter when seeking the seizure. Each 
quick seizure could produce a multi-year litigation hangover.  
Second, depending on the scienter level added to the statute, 
the wrongful seizure cause of action could be negated. For 
example, the cause of action for wrongfully sending copyright 
takedown notices (a § 512(f) claim, added in the DMCA)29 fails if 
the copyright owner had a “subjective good faith” when sending 
the takedown notice.30 Due to this high scienter requirement, it 
has become virtually impossible for plaintiffs to win § 512(f) 
claims,31 and as a result, 512(f) lawsuits are rarely brought. An 
                                                                                                     
Waco International v. KHK Scaffolding, et. al., 3 MINN. INTELL. PROP. REV. 59 
(2002) (discussing the Lanham Act wrongful seizure provision requirements).  
  As discussed below, however, the Lanham Act’s wrongful seizure cause 
of action applies only when the seizure was in “bad faith.” Infra note 32 and 
accompanying text. It is unclear why the Act does not have an equally explicit 
scienter standard.  
 29. 17 U.S.C. § 512(f) (2012). 
 30. Rossi v. Motion Picture Ass’n of Am. Inc., 391 F.3d 1000, 1004 (9th Cir. 
2004) (“[Section] 512(c)(3)(A)(v) imposes a subjective good faith requirement 
upon copyright owners.”). 
 31. For example, Lenz v. Universal Music, Nos. 13–16106 & 13–16107, 
2015 WL 5315388, at *1, *6 (9th Cir. Sept. 14, 2015) requires senders to 
consider the possibility that the complained-about usage could constitute fair 
use, but the court reiterated that there was no liability if the sender had 
subjective good faith. This scienter standard makes it virtually impossible for 
§ 512(f) plaintiffs to win because they cannot find or introduce evidence 
disproving the sender’s subjective good faith. See Venkat Balasubramani, 9th 
Circuit Sides With Fair Use in Dancing Baby Takedown Case, TECH. & 
MARKETING L. BLOG (Sept. 21, 2015), 
http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2015/09/9th-circuit-sides-with-fair-use-in-
dancing-baby-takedown-case.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 2015) (describing Lenz’s 
key holdings and implications on fair use) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review).  
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overly trade secret owner-favorable scienter requirement will 
make wrongful seizure claims equally ineffectual. 
Finally, even if injured seizure victims can successfully sue 
for a wrongful or excessive seizure, what will their damages be? 
The Seizure Provision cross-references the Lanham Act’s 
analogous ex parte seizure provision for counterfeit goods,32 
which specifies the following relief: 
[The injured party] shall be entitled to recover such relief as 
may be appropriate, including damages for lost profits, cost of 
materials, loss of good will, and punitive damages in instances 
where the seizure was sought in bad faith, and, unless the 
court finds extenuating circumstances, to recover a reasonable 
attorney’s fee. The court in its discretion may award 
prejudgment interest . . . .33  
That sounds great, but what does this mean in practice? How 
courts assess damages will determine whether or not the Seizure 
Provision operates as intended.  
For example, several Congress members indicated that 
punitive damages should eliminate any risk of competitive 
misuse.34 The odds of a court awarding punitive damages, 
however, are extremely low. Courts are likely to require the 
injured party to show that the trade secret owner acted with 
subjective bad faith, but admissible non-circumstantial evidence 
of such bad faith will rarely exist. Furthermore, as discussed 
below, trade secret owners may simply be ignorant of their case’s 
weaknesses until challenged by an adversary, and judges are not 
likely to award punitive damages when the trade secret owner 
does inadequate or poor research. So, while truly egregious 
seizures may trigger punitive damages, it is overly optimistic to 
think that punitive damages will eliminate abusive seizures.  
Additionally, calculating non-punitive damages will be 
challenging. A seizure could massively disrupt a targeted 
business or even temporarily shut it down; and the resulting 
                                                                                                     
 32. 15 U.S.C. § 1116 (2012). 
 33. Id. § 1116(d)(11). 
 34. At the Markup Hearing, Congressmembers referenced “punitive 
damages” five times. See Markup Hearing, supra note 3. For example, Rep. 
Goodlatte said that “if a larger company improperly goes after a small business 
or start-up, they have a remedy that includes punitive damages for any harm 
done to it.” Id. ll. 529–31. 
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business interference could kill the targeted business 
permanently. For well-established businesses with predictable 
revenues and costs, it may be possible to non-speculatively 
estimate the costs and foregone revenues from a wrongful 
seizure. In contrast, thinly resourced start-up enterprises could 
suffer less clear consequences from a wrongful seizure. As we are 
increasingly seeing small start-ups blossom into Unicorns and 
Decacorns,35 a disrupted start-up may lose billions of dollars of 
market cap potential.36 Judges will be reluctant to award large 
and seemingly speculative compensating damages to an unproven 
start-up, even if a seizure permanently diminishes or destroys its 
business.37  
3. Implications 
With respect to the Seizure Provision’s effects, the devil is in 
details that Congress has not resolved (yet). If the courts 
interpret the Act to create strict liability for a wrongful seizure 
and award large damages from lost business opportunities, trade 
secret owners will be too afraid to use the provision. In contrast, 
if courts require subjective bad faith to establish a wrongful 
seizure and narrowly construe the damages from disruption and 
lost business opportunities, trade secret owners will seek ex parte 
seizures routinely. Congress could further tweak the wrongful 
seizure provisions to make its intent clearer, though it will not be 
                                                                                                     
 35. A Unicorn is a private company with a billion dollar valuation, and a 
Decacorn is a private company with a ten billion dollar valuation. Jillian 
D’Onfro, There Are So Many $10 Billion Startups That There’s A New Name for 
Them: ‘Decacorns’, BUSINESS INSIDER (Mar. 18, 2015, 9:42 AM), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/decacorn-is-the-new-unicorn-2015-3 (last visited 
Oct. 25, 2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 36. Cf. Eric Goldman, UMG v. Shelter Capital: A Cautionary Tale of 
Rightsowner Overzealousness, TECH. & MARKETING L. BLOG (Dec. 27, 2011), 
http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2011/12/umg_v_shelter_c.htm (last visited 
Oct. 25, 2015) (discussing how copyright owner lawfare squashed a promising 
start-up competitor to YouTube, despite the start-up’s compliance with the law, 
and suggesting that a billion dollar bond would have been appropriate to ensure 
compensation for the start-up’s lost opportunity) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
 37. Cf. Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., No. 5:07–cv–03783–JF, 2013 WL 
271673, at *8–9 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 2013) (circumscribing damages for a 
wrongful copyright takedown). 
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possible to fix other structural problems with the Seizure 
Provisions discussed below. Otherwise, without further revisions, 
the wrongful seizure claim will not, as Congress apparently 
hopes, suppress or redress overreaching and abusive seizure 
requests. 
C. Overlaps With Other Seizure Statutes 
Even without the Seizure Provision, trade secret owners can 
effectuate ex parte seizures in several ways (in addition to 
criminal law enforcement for stolen chattel).  
1. TROs 
Trade secret owners already may seek ex parte TROs, 
including impoundment, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
65(b). As the Committee Notes on Rules to the 2001 amendment38 
indicate: 
A common question has arisen from the experience that notice 
of a proposed impoundment may enable an infringer to defeat 
the court’s capacity to grant effective relief. Impoundment may 
be ordered on an ex parte basis under subdivision (b) if the 
applicant makes a strong showing of the reasons why notice is 
likely to defeat effective relief. Such no-notice procedures are 
authorized in trademark infringement proceedings, see 15 
U.S.C. §1116(d), and courts have provided clear illustrations of 
the kinds of showings that support ex parte relief. See Matter 
of Vuitton et Fils S.A., 606 F.2d 1 (2d Cir.1979); Vuitton v. 
White, 945 F.2d 569 (3d Cir.1991). In applying the tests for no-
notice relief, the court should ask whether impoundment is 
necessary, or whether adequate protection can be had by a less 
intrusive form of no-notice relief shaped as a temporary 
restraining order.  
The next section will explain why courts should apply these 
provisions with extreme caution in trade secret cases. 
Nevertheless, for purposes of assessing the need for the Seizure 
                                                                                                     
 38. FED. R. CIV. P. 65, advisory committee’s notes on the 2001 amendment. 
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Provision, existing federal TRO procedures already provide for ex 
parte seizures for trade secret owners.39  
Recognizing this overlap, the Act expressly provides for ex 
parte seizures only when TROs would be ineffective because the 
applicable party “would evade, avoid, or otherwise not comply 
with such an order.”40 But because Rule 65 already contemplates 
ex parte seizures, what do those circumstances look like? For 
example, the Seizure Provision is probably still too slow to 
redress the paradigmatic Valuable Artifact “grab-and-go” 
scenario. 
On the plus side, the Seizure Provision provides trade secret-
specific procedures—including a balancing of the various parties’ 
interests—that helpfully supplement Rule 65’s more general 
procedures. To achieve that benefit, however, the Act would need 
to expressly cross-reference Rule 65 ex parte seizures in trade 
secret cases. As drafted now, the Seizure Provision only applies 
when TROs do not.  
Furthermore, though the Seizure Provision has numerous 
safeguards, it does not expressly tell judges that seizure orders 
should be extraordinary; as a result, judges may treat the Seizure 
Provision as relatively routine. Linking the Seizure Provision to 
Rule 65 would communicate to judges, who already know that ex 
parte TROs are extraordinary, that these seizures also should be 
treated as extraordinary. Or, Congress could expressly say that 
the seizures are extraordinary. 
2. ITC § 337 Investigations 
The International Trade Commission (“ITC”) can exclude 
infringing goods from being imported into the United States.41 
Such proceedings are called § 337 investigations. The ITC can 
issue exclusion orders based on trade secrets,42 so § 337 
                                                                                                     
 39. See generally, e.g., V’Guara Inc. v. Dec, 925 F. Supp. 2d 1120 (D. Nev. 
2013) (granting an ex parte TRO to prevent trade secret misappropriation). 
 40. S. 1890, 114th Cong. § 2(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I) (2015). 
 41. 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (2012). 
 42. See TianRui Grp. Co. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 661 F.3d 1322, 1338 (Fed. 
Cir. 2011) (“[W]e therefore hold that it was proper for the Commission to find a 
section 337 violation based in part on acts of trade secret misappropriation 
occurring overseas.”); P. Andrew Riley & Jonathan Stroud, A Survey of Trade 
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investigations provide trade secret owners with another option to 
interdict items. Exclusion orders may be issued on an expedited 
basis, such as in a TRO.43 
Admittedly, § 337 exclusion orders solve different problems 
than the Seizure Provision. First, although the allegedly 
infringing party does not need to participate in the investigation, 
they receive notice of the investigation before any seizures 
occur.44 Second, § 337 investigations are faster than typical 
litigation,45 but they are usually much slower than the Seizure 
Provision. Third, a § 337 exclusion order only restricts the 
movement of goods into the United States,46 so it may not help 
when a seizure target is a domestic company. Nevertheless, 
a § 337 investigation may overlap with some situations where a 
trade secret owner would consider the Seizure Provision. 
3. Seizure Provisions in Ancillary Doctrines 
Defendants may simultaneously violate several of a 
plaintiff’s IP rights, in which case the other IPs may offer a 
seizure remedy that would indirectly help protect the trade secret 
as well.47 As discussed above, the Lanham Act has an ex parte 
                                                                                                     
Secret Investigations at the International Trade Commission: A Model for Future 
Litigants, 42 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 41, 50–54 (2013) (surveying the ITC’s 
trade secret docket). 
 43. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(e)(3) (2012). 
 44. Id. § 1337(b)(1). 
 45. See id. (instructing the ITC to reach its conclusions “at the earliest 
practicable time” and specifying Congress’s desire for “expeditious 
adjudication”); see also U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, PUB. NO. 4105, ANSWERS TO 
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 23, ¶ 18 (2009), 
http://www.usitc.gov/intellectual_property/documents/337_faqs.pdf 
(“Historically, the Commission has strived to complete most investigations in 
less than 15 months.”).  
 46. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d)(1) (2012). 
 47. For example, the Religious Technology Center (“RTC”), also known as 
the Church of Scientology, initiated a series of crackdowns on Internet leaks of 
its secret texts using copyright’s ex parte seizure provision. See Natalie 
Hanlon-Leh, Lessons From Cyberspace & Outerspace: The Scientology Cases, 27 
A.B.A. SUM BRIEF 48, 57 (1998) (explaining the seizure issues involved in the 
Scientology cases). At the conclusion of the RTC’s enforcement actions, there 
were substantial questions about the enforcement action’s legitimacy, which 
raise related questions about the appropriateness of the initial ex parte seizure. 
See id. at 58 (ending with the question: “How should a court approach seizure 
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seizure procedure for counterfeit goods. Copyright law also 
provides an impoundment remedy48 that may be pursued ex 
parte49 following the same procedures and restrictions as the 
trademark counterfeiting seizure statutory provisions. Registered 
copyright and trademark owners also can record their rights with 
the Customs Department,50 which will impound infringing goods 
as they go through customs.  
Similarly, other quasi-IP rights can provide overlapping ex 
parte remedies, such as the Computer Fraud & Abuse Act.51 
Finally, ex parte chattel-oriented remedies may apply to 
chattel that contains trade secrets, such as replevin and 
sequestration.52 
4. Summary 
Given the numerous ex parte seizure procedures already in 
place, it is hard to construct a realistic hypothetical where the 
Seizure Provision will solve a problem that no existing seizure 
mechanism addresses. What, exactly, is the problem Congress is 
convinced needs to be solved? 
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and impoundment of computer media to protect against abuses and unlawful 
searches?”). 
 48. 17 U.S.C. § 503 (2012).  
 49. Id. § 503(a)(3). 
 50. Intellectual Property Rights E-Recordation (IPRR) Application, U.S. 
CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., https://iprr.cbp.gov/ (last visited Oct. 25, 2015) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 51. See, e.g., Transcon. Fund Admin., LLC v. Zhani, No. 15 Civ. 8840, at *2 
(N.D. Ill. Oct. 8, 2015) (issuing an ex parte TRO on Computer Fraud & Abuse 
Act grounds because the defendant threatened “to make the files he stole public, 
thus improperly disclosing the misappropriated information to the world at 
large”), available at 
http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2065&context=his
torical. 
 52. See, e.g., William P. Glenn, Jr., Ex-Parte Seizure of Intellectual Property 
Goods, 9 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 307, 310–13 (2001) (providing an overview of 
seizure remedies). 
 53. Ex parte seizures also raise Constitutional issues, including potential 
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The previous Part of this Essay critiqued the Seizure 
Provision’s specific details. This Part will take a higher-level look 
at why ex parte seizures in trade secret cases are universally 
problematic, whether via the Seizure Provision or existing ex 
parte seizure processes. 
A. Our System Is Not Designed for Ex Parte Proceedings 
In general, our legal system was not built for ex parte 
proceedings. Our system relies on adversarial proceedings, where 
advocates make their case before a neutral adjudicator. In theory, 
in adversarial proceedings, self-interested advocates will 
highlight their strongest arguments and highlight the 
weaknesses of their opponent’s arguments; and in theory, this 
back-and-forth between advocates helps the truth emerge. 
Because the advocates are trashing each other’s arguments, the 
judge can focus on enforcing the applicable rules of engagement 
to ensure that the advocates do not overreach procedurally. 
An adjudicatory system built for adversarial proceedings 
cannot handle ex parte proceedings very well.54 While the 
petitioner will showcase its case’s strengths, a self-interested 
opponent will not be present to point out the case’s weaknesses. 
As a result, the judge only hears the petitioner’s glossiest story. 
For judges used to picking between the advocates’ narratives 
after they have been picked apart by their opponents, only 
hearing one side of the story runs contrary to the judge’s 
traditional decision-making process.55 
                                                                                                     
due process, search and seizure, and First Amendment problems. See, e.g., Mark 
D. Robins, Computers and the Discovery of Evidence—A New Dimension To Civil 
Procedure, 17 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 411, 487–90 (1999) 
(addressing Constitutional restrictions on ex parte seizure orders). The 
Constitutional issues are beyond this Essay’s scope. 
 54. See Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Teamsters, 415 U.S. 423, 439 (1974) 
(“[O]ur entire jurisprudence runs counter to the notion of court action taken 
before reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard has been granted both 
sides of a dispute.”). 
 55.  A similar dynamic occurs with class action settlements, where plaintiff 
and defense counsel jointly urge the judge to approve their desired settlement. 
Judges may try to rely on class objectors as a counterweight to the possibility of 
collusion between plaintiff and defense counsel, but objectors rarely materialize 
or invest much energy in their advocacy. See generally, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg 
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Judges could compensate for this one-sided advocacy by 
actively challenging the petitioner’s glossy story. Sometimes this 
happens. More frequently, however, judges are not used to, or 
comfortable with, acting as an active counterweight to the 
petitioner’s narrative. Some of this reticence may reflect the 
personality of judges, but it also reflects the judge’s lack of first-
hand knowledge about the facts. Unlike an adversarial opponent, 
who has its own first-hand knowledge of the facts at issue, a 
judge not personally involved in the situation cannot guess what 
countervailing facts might exist. With this limited understanding 
of the facts, judges are not well-positioned to confidently push 
back against a petitioner’s factual narrative. 
Because of the heightened risk of errors attributable to their 
procedural deficiencies, all ex parte remedies should be 
exceptionally rare. They also should be coupled with industrial-
grade procedural protections, though strong procedural 
protections are not enough to prevent serious harm. 
We have seen several examples of misguided ex parte 
seizures in the IP context, even when (nominally) supervised by 
judges. One set of examples comes from the Department of 
Homeland Security’s Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
(“ICE”) domain name seizures, as part of “Operation In Our 
Sites” and other campaigns.56 Pursuant to its civil seizure 
authority (and thus, with a magistrate judge’s approval), ICE has 
seized hundreds of domain names allegedly used to commit 
copyright and trademark infringement.57 Unfortunately, because 
ICE does not consult with targeted domain name owners, 
unsurprisingly, ICE has made numerous serious mistakes in its 
seizures. 
For example, regarding the domain name Dajaz1.com, ICE 
made a mistake of fact. It believed that the site published 
infringing songs, when in fact copyright owners voluntarily 
                                                                                                     
& Geoffrey Miller, The Role of Op-outs and Objectors in Class Action Litigation: 
Theoretical and Empirical Issues, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1529 (2004). 
 56. See Annemarie Bridy, Carpe Omnia: Civil Forfeiture in the War on 
Drugs and the War on Piracy, 46 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 683, 708–26 (2015) (discussing 
ICE’s various domain name seizure programs). 
 57. Operation In Our Sites, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T (May 22, 2014), 
https://www.ice.gov/factsheets/ipr-in-our-sites (last visited Oct. 25, 2015) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
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submitted songs to Dajaz1 hoping they would be published. ICE 
later admitted that its sole evidence against Dajaz1 was 
unverified allegations from the RIAA, allegations which the RIAA 
subsequently admitted were uninformed.58  
With “Rojadirecta” domain names operated by Puerto 80, 
ICE made a mistake of law. Puerto 80 had already defeated 
infringement claims in its home country of Spain, yet ICE 
believed that the domain names were being used for infringing 
conduct in the United States. After new legal precedent59 
reinforced that ICE’s seizure was predicated on an incorrect 
interpretation of the law, ICE simply gave up and returned the 
domain names.60 
Because ICE’s erroneous seizures are tantamount to shutting 
down legal speech, the seizures of completely legal domain names 
raise obvious Constitutional problems. They also show the 
difficulty of redressing the harms of the mistaken seizure. Even if 
we made the domain name owners “whole” for the losses they 
suffered from the wrongful seizure, we will never know what 
socially beneficial activities we lost because of the government’s 
disruption/censorship of legal speech. 
A different ICE seizure highlights the inevitably of collateral 
damage from wrongful seizures.61 As part of its Operation Save 
                                                                                                     
 58. Mike Masnick, Breaking News: Feds Falsely Censor Popular Blog For 
Over A Year, Deny All Due Process, Hide All Details . . . , TECHDIRT (Dec. 8, 
2011, 8:29 AM), 
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20111208/08225217010/breaking-news-feds-
falsely-censor-popular-blog-over-year-deny-all-due-process-hide-all-details.shtml 
(last visited Oct. 25, 2015) (giving an account of this scandal) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 59. Flava Works, Inc. v. Gunter, 689 F.3d 754 (7th Cir. 2012).  
 60. See Ryan Singel, Oops! Copyright Cops Return Seized RojaDirecta 
Domain Names—19 Months Later, WIRED (Aug. 29, 2012, 4:07 PM), 
http://www.wired.com/2012/08/domain-names-returned/ (last visited Oct. 25, 
2015) (“The government, which seized the domain names for simply including 
links to copyrighted content, dropped the Rojadirecta claim, seemingly due to a 
recent ruling by Judge Richard Posner.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). See generally Puerto 80 Projects, S.L.U. v. United States, No. 11 
Civ. 3983 (S.D.N.Y. terminated Aug. 4, 2011). 
 61. See Press Release, Office of the Press Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland 
Sec., Joint DHS-DOJ “Operation Protect Our Children” Seizes Website Domains 
Involved in Advertising and Distributing Child Pornography (Feb. 15, 2011), 
http://www.dhs.gov/news/2011/02/15/joint-dhs-doj-operation-protect-our-
children-seizes-website-domains-involved (last visited Oct. 25, 2015) 
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Our Children, ICE seized the Mooo.com domain name because it 
allegedly facilitated the distribution of child pornography. 
Mooo.com, however, was a user-generated content service that 
hosted 84,000 different websites, only one of which was the target 
of ICE’s operation. Because of ICE’s poor research, 84,000 
legitimate websites were taken offline as the collateral damage of 
ICE’s overreaching pursuit of one illegitimate website.62  
It is easy to mock ICE for being digital Keystone Kops, but 
we should not dismiss their errors as purely due to ICE’s 
incompetence, randomness, or anomalies. Instead, ex parte 
seizures inevitably and unavoidably will make mistakes, so of 
course ICE’s campaign of ex parte seizures was destined to screw 
up, no matter how careful ICE was—though ICE’s incompetence 
did not help.  
ICE’s mistakes also demonstrate how difficult it is to 
compensate the victims of wrongful seizures. In the Mooo.com 
case, how can we adequately compensate the tens of thousands of 
disrupted webmasters? Just like it is impossible to make these 
victims of ICE’s wrongful seizures whole, it seems unlikely that 
the Seizure Provision’s wrongful seizure cause of action will 
adequately redress the many victims of wrongful seizures. 
 
                                                                                                     
(announcing “the execution of seizure warrants against 10 domain names of 
websites engaged in the advertisement and distribution of child pornography as 
part of ‘Operation Protect Our Children’”) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review).  
 62. See Ernesto, U.S. Government Shuts Down 84,000 Websites, ‘By 
Mistake’, TORRENTFREAK (Feb. 16, 2011), https://torrentfreak.com/u-s-
government-shuts-down-84000-websites-by-mistake-110216/ (last visited Oct. 
25, 2015) (discussing ICE’s “massive error”) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review).  
  The Megaupload case provides another example of how legitimate 
players can become collateral damage in an overzealous seizure. See, for 
example, Kyle Goodwin’s lawsuit to obtain the files he stored on Megaupload’s 
servers that were seized during the U.S. government’s pursuit of alleged 
infringers on Megaupload’s service. United States v. Dotcom, No. 12 Crim. 3 
(E.D. Va. Aug. 21, 2015); see Megaupload Data Seizure, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER 
FOUND., https://www.eff.org/cases/megaupload-data-seizure (last visited Oct. 25, 
2015) (providing documents from this suit) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review).  
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B. Special Fact Issues in Trade Secret Cases 
While all ex parte seizure processes will make mistakes, 
some distinctive features about trade secrets make ex parte 
seizures involving trade secrets especially error-prone. 
1. Existence of a Trade Secret 
The Act says a seizure order may issue if the plaintiff 
is likely to succeed in showing that— 
(aa) the information is a trade secret; 
(bb) the person against whom seizure would be ordered— 
(AA) misappropriated the trade secret of the applicant by 
improper means; or 
(BB) conspired to use improper means to misappropriate 
the trade secret of the applicant; and 
(cc) the person against whom seizure would be ordered has 
possession of the trade secret.63 
Because the statutory definition of “trade secret” is so 
expansive,64 to satisfy this pleading standard, the plaintiff simply 
needs to present evidence that it tried to keep its information 
secret and derived value from the information. 
In an ordinary adversarial process, the defendant would 
attack the subject information’s status as a trade secret. Loss of 
trade secret status, however, is typically confirmed only after 
                                                                                                     
 63. S. 1890, 114th Cong. § 2(b)(2)(A)(ii)(IV) (2015). 
 64. As defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3) (2012): 
the term “trade secret” means all forms and types of financial, 
business, scientific, technical, economic, or engineering information, 
including patterns, plans, compilations, program devices, formulas, 
designs, prototypes, methods, techniques, processes, procedures, 
programs, or codes, whether tangible or intangible, and whether or 
how stored, compiled, or memorialized physically, electronically, 
graphically, photographically, or in writing if— 
(A) the owner thereof has taken reasonable measures to keep such 
information secret; and 
(B) the information derives independent economic value, actual or 
potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily 
ascertainable through proper means by, the public. 
See Christopher B. Seaman, The Case Against Federalizing Trade Secrecy, 101 
VA. L. REV. 317, 361 (2015) (explaining how this definition is broader than the 
Uniform Trade Secret Act’s definition). 
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substantial discovery, which helps explain why trade secret 
misappropriation litigation is so costly.65 But in an ex parte 
action, the plaintiff’s claim that the information is a trade secret 
goes unchallenged. There are several ways this can lead to 
erroneous results, such as botched secrecy and reverse 
engineering. 
a. Botched Secrecy 
A classic way that a trade secret owner loses trade secret 
protection is by the owner’s mishandling of secrecy. Often, the 
owners do not realize they did not maintain secrecy correctly. In 
those cases, plaintiffs can pursue an ex parte action based on 
their uninformed, but erroneous, belief that they still have trade 
secret protection. A court has almost no chance of discovering the 
lost secrecy on its own. 
b. Reverse Engineering 
Similarly, a third party usually66 may reverse engineer trade 
secrets and freely use that information.67 After a successful 
reverse engineering, the trade secret owner can prove that the 
defendant “possesses” the information the plaintiff asserts is a 
trade secret (as required by subparagraph (cc)), even though the 
defendant could show—if it appeared in court—that such 
possession was completely lawful.  
                                                                                                     
 65. Litigation costs for trade secret cases are substantially more than 
copyright and trademark cases of similar stakes, and the costs can often exceed 
$1 million. 2015 Report of the Economic Survey, AM. INTELL. PROP. L. ASS’N 
(AIPLA) (2015), 
http://www.aipla.org/learningcenter/library/books/econsurvey/2015EconomicSur
vey/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Oct. 25, 2015) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
 66. Exceptions might include contractual restrictions on reverse 
engineering or restrictions on circumvention in 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2012). 
 67. See, e.g., Unif. Trade Secrets Act, comment to Section 1 (1985) (“Proper 
means include . . . [d]iscovery by ‘reverse engineering’, that is, by starting with 
the known product and working backward to find the method by which it was 
developed.”). 
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Because trade secret owners can lose trade secret status 
without knowing it, inevitably even well-meaning and careful 
trade secret owners will cause erroneous ex parte seizures. 
c. Trade Secrets Are Different . . . 
A copyright owner must register its work before suing.68 
Trademark registration is not required to bring a trademark 
claim,69 but a Lanham Act ex parte seizure of counterfeit goods 
requires a registered trademark.70 As part of the registration 
process, a government examiner will review the subject matter’s 
eligibility for protection before issuing the registration.71 Thus, in 
an ex parte application involving copyrights and trademarks, a 
public servant has already confirmed copyrightability or 
trademarkability, and this provides the judge with well-informed 
and independent guidance about protectability. 
In contrast, there is no registration scheme for trade secrets, 
and no government official reviews a plaintiff’s claim to have a 
trade secret prior to an enforcement action. Thus, in trade secret 
cases, judges must review the existence of a trade secret as a 
matter of first impression, without any guidance from an 
independent government examiner.72 This determination, 
conducted ex parte by a non-specialist judge, necessarily will 
make more mistakes than ex parte proceedings based on 
registered copyrights and trademarks. 
                                                                                                     
 68. See 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (2012) (“[N]o civil action for infringement of the 
copyright in any United States work shall be instituted until preregistration or 
registration of the copyright claim has been made in accordance with this 
title.”). 
 69. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2012). 
 70. Id. § 1116(d)(1)(A). Courts can and do, however, provide ex parte 
remedies for unregistered marks. See Lucas G. Paglia & Mark A. Rush, End 
Game: The Ex Parte Seizure Process and the Battle Against Bootleggers, 4 VAND. 
J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 4, 8 (2002) (describing courts’ authority to do this under the 
Lanham Act). 
 71. See 17 U.S.C. § 410 (2012) (relating to copyright); 15 U.S.C. § 1115(a) 
(2012) (regarding trademark). 
 72. See Markup Hearing, supra note 3, ll. 430–53 (statement of Rep. 
Lofgren) (discussing these differences between trade secrets and 
copyrights/trademarks). 
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2. Ownership of a Trade Secret 
Even if the subject information is a trade secret, the plaintiff 
may not own it. For example, when trade secrets are developed 
collaboratively, each contributor may have a tenable claim to own 
any resulting trade secrets. If one collaborator seeks an ex parte 
seizure against the other collaborator, the judge cannot easily 
confirm the plaintiff’s ownership claim. 
The Seizure Provision does not require the judge to 
rigorously review the plaintiff’s ownership claim. Indeed, the 
plaintiff is not required to allege its ownership; it is only required 
to show misappropriation “by improper means.”73 But a 
defendant’s lawful exercise of dominion over a trade secret it 
owns would look like “misappropriation” to a plaintiff. 
As with the existence of a trade secret, trade secrets differ 
from registration-based IPs because the putative owner must 
establish ownership during the registration process. Although the 
subsequent chain of title might get murky (IP ownership 
transfers do not have to be recorded), the initial registration 
provides at least some useful information about ownership to the 
judge. In contrast, there is no government determination of their 
ownership before a trade secret suit. Without any guidance from 
a government agency about ownership identity, a judge in an ex 
parte proceeding for trade secrets cannot easily scrutinize the 
plaintiff’s self-serving claims of ownership. 
3. Summary of How Trade Secrets Are Different 
It is tempting to think that because trademarks and 
copyrights have their own ex parte seizure provisions, so should 
trade secrets. Trade secret doctrine, however, works differently 
than copyright and trademarks in ways that affect the legitimacy 
of ex parte seizures, so imitating their seizure provisions does not 
make sense. 
Further, the Seizure Provision could apply to chattels that 
store intangible information, which is potentially every electronic 
item used by a business. In contrast, the copyright and 
                                                                                                     
 73. S. 1890, 114th Cong. § 2(b)(2)(A)(ii)(IV)(bb)(AA) (2015). 
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trademark ex parte seizure provisions apply to chattel 
manufactured for sale that was designed to infringe, so the 
seizure’s risk of collateral damage is lower and more effective—
for example, it keeps illegitimate goods off the streets.  
IV. Conclusion 
With its outdated chattel focus and serious drafting 
ambiguities, the Seizure Provision’s true raison d’être remains 
murky. It also remains unclear why existing legal tools are 
inadequate. As Representative Johnson said at the Markup 
Hearing, “I am somewhat baffled still as far as the need for” the 
Seizure Provision.74 
Because the law targets problems that may never exist, it 
does not make sense to create another dangerous exception to our 
adversarial-based legal system. The procedural fast lane comes 
with the potential for significant competitive abuse,75 where a 
competitor can potentially kick its rival out of the industry—at 
least for a little while—before the rival gets a chance to make its 
case in court.  
Given the unique attributes of trade secrets that make 
plaintiffs’ self-serving statements impossible for judges to 
evaluate independently, additional procedural mechanisms are 
not enough to reduce the risk of errors. Instead, we should fess up 
to the unavoidable error risks of any ex parte seizures for trade 
secrets. Accordingly, it would make sense to strip the Seizure 
Provision from the Act, and judges should treat all other ex parte 
requests in trade secret cases as the extraordinary requests they 
really are. 
 
                                                                                                     
 74. Markup Hearing, supra note 3, ll. 729–30. 
 75. See David S. Levine & Sharon K. Sandeen, Here Come the Trade Secret 
Trolls, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 230, 255–57 (2015), 
http://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr-online/vol71/iss4/3 (describing ways 
this provision could squash competition).  
